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About the author

When Dr. Li Choh-Ming, the CUHK's first Vice Chancellor, began his search for the founding director of the University's new Social Survey Research Centre, he turned to his former colleagues at the University of California-Berkeley for a candidate who combined expertise in Chinese, survey research, policy studies, the management of research programs, and fund-raising. This is how Dr. Mitchell came to Hong Kong in 1966. He studied Chinese as an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, graduated from Harvard's China Area Program, and earned his sociology Ph.D. from Columbia University where he was also a project director at the University's Bureau for Applied Social Research. At Berkeley he was the Deputy Director of the Survey Research Center and established an international data-collection and research program. In addition to his duties as a University Research Professor and Director of a research center in Hong Kong, Dr. Mitchell conducted foundation-supported research in the region and also served as a technical consultant to one of the region's largest commercial market research firms. He returned to American academic life as a professor of urban and regional planning and as the founding director of another social science research center at Florida State Univeristy. In additon to his research, writing, fund-raising, consulting and teaching, he served for a number of years as a director of task forces established by the Governor and Legislature of Florida prior to taking a leave of absence to serve as a social science advisor to the Near East Bureau of the United States Agency for International Development. He subsequently became a Foreign Service Officer with long-term postings in Egypt, Yemen and Guinea-Bissau. Since retiring from government service, he has worked as a consultant in the Near East, West Africa and Southern Africa. Living now in Alexandria, Virginia, Dr. Mitchell has an active research and consulting agenda. His email address is romitch@moon.jic.com

Velvet Colonialism's Legacy to Hong Kong
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Social and political stability is as important to business confidence, trade and investment in Hong Kong today as it was under British colonial rule in the 1960s. Some of Britain's success in achieving growth with stability resulted from well-considered policies. But much can be attributed to forces over which the colonial government had little influence. Hong Kong's current rulers can benefit from the lessons of both these planned and unplanned developments. Both are the legacy of velvet colonialism.

Colonial authorities pursued three pro-stability policies: positive non-intervention in the market, maximum personal freedom but minimal democracy, and hesitant, often unplanned social policy initiatives. Positive non-intervention was built on a progressively more transparent and efficient legal and institutional structure that encouraged trade and investment. This infrastructure would have had little benefit if the colony suffered the same political, social and military turmoil that plagued China almost from the founding of the colony. Largely successful restrictions on popular participation activities helped control politically-inspired disruptions and delayed moves toward greater democracy.

Democratic reforms are of very recent origin. The development of new social policies and programs has a longer history. Although the colonial government initiated a successful housing program in 1954, it was not until mild street disturbances in 1966 and more serious ones in 1967 that government adopted a more pro-active approach to social issues.

Britain's velvet colonialism, then, was based on successful economic growth policies that created near full employment, a political-control strategy, and social sector initiatives.

Both the colonial government in the 1960s and the current one under the Beijing-appointed Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa share common views (and myths) about some of the hidden forces behind Hong Kong's development. These include beliefs about the traditional Chinese family, "the Chinese way," Asian cultural values, the importance of consensus, and group (rather than individual) rights and obligations. Such beliefs are used in the region to counter proponents of democracy and individual rights.

By 1965, social welfare and government leaders recognized that the colony's working and living conditions were weakening traditional values that in turn were undercutting the traditional family system. These changes meant that government and non-government organizations (NGOs) would have to expand their humanitarian assistance programs and provide additional, still unknown new services. To gain a better understanding of the likely demands to be placed on them for these services, the Social Welfare Department within the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs (SCA) and the Hong Kong Council of Social Services launched in 1966 the Urban Family Life Survey (UFLS), a series of several studies. I was appointed Director of these studies in my capacity as founding director of a research center established within the newly-created Chinese University of Hong Kong. (The University of California-Berkeley loaned me to the Chinese University for this purpose.)

Although Hong Kong in 1997 is different from what it was 30 years ago, many of the issues we explored in 1967 have continuing relevance to policies affecting families, labor, housing, the social organization of the community, and democratic governance. On the other hand, we would have been far off the mark if we had tried to predict what Hong Kong would be 30 years into the future. This reminds us that our materials are time and place-specific. Informed speculation is the most that can be claimed for how the 1967 data throw light on today's Hong Kong. This speculation is based on large-scale, international-comparative sample surveys on family and population trends, the way certain physical environments affected people, the basis for organized social life,

and what might be considered more ephemeral attitudes toward civic and political issues. This reliance on the society-wide aggregation of information collected from individuals gives a perspective different from one that focuses on larger institutions, government programs, and policy-decisions made over the 30 years from 1967 to 1997. Our concern is with underlying heavy trends and with how certain features of the physical, economic and social environments affect individuals and families, regardless of the time period examined.

1967, One Point in a 155-Year Trajectory of Change

May 1967 to January 1968 has been characterized as a "Reign of Terror" that forced changes in the "Unreformed State" (1842-1966) and an "Oligarchy Entrenched" (1945-1967). Next came "Years of Economic Hardship and Struggling for Survival" (1967-1973) followed by "Rising Income and Falling Inequality" (1960-1973), "Hong Kong New Society" and "Popular Government" from 1968 to 1997.[1] The 1967 Reign of Terror refers to serious communist-led disturbances that were a spillover from the chaos resulting from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its Red Guards in China. British interests were attacked in China itself, and there was loss of life in the colony.

Living and working conditions in 1967 Hong Kong created an environment that many observers would have thought local communists or trouble-makers could easily exploit. Possible reasons why the 1966-67 demonstrations received so little support will be explored later. Suffice it to say, these were not the colony's first disturbances. As Tsai Jung-Fang reports in his *Hong Kong in Chinese History*, "There was a long tradition of Chinese resistance to British colonial rule in Hong Kong. Some anticolonial social protests… were linked to Chinese nationalism; but others were not" (Tsai 1993, p. 292). Coolie disturbances in eight different years from 1861 to 1895 protested actions affecting worker livelihood. Nationalism and anti-foreignism were behind early 20th-century

disturbances, including a boycott of American goods in 1905-06 to protest a series of anti-Chinese exclusion acts dating back to 1882.

China was in a near-constant state of turmoil during most of Hong Kong's short history. There were foreign incursions and concessions; military use of force to advance Christian missionaries and national interests ("Christ rode to China on a cannonball" was one phrase used to describe this unholy alliance); the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty, and the rise of warlords. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) success did not end the chaos. Instead, China was wracked by a series of internal campaigns — the Hundred Flowers Blooming Campaign of 1956, the Great Leap Forward two years later, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, and numerous 4-this and 5-that campaigns against alleged enemies of the state.

By comparison with its neighbors, Hong Kong was a peaceful haven. But the success of the PRC had two significant early impacts on the colony. First was the large influx of refugees, and second, British foreign policy had to avoid any provocation of its large neighbor.

The colony was not provocation-free. The UN Korean War embargo of trade in certain goods with China was the most serious. It forced a significant shift of the colony's economy from trade to manufacturing. Short-lived riots in 1956 involving right-wing Nationalist (the defeated Kuo Min Tang) attacks against Communist unions, as well as disturbances attributed to criminal triad elements were another provocation. The riots in 1967 were another.[2]

Despite political turmoil and a refugee-created population explosion, the colony's economy prospered. The 1996 per capita GDP of US$27,202 exceeded that of Great Britain ($19,500) and was 9.5 times that of China ($2,900).[3]

The 1967 disturbances (or "troubles" in the vocabulary of the time) accelerated colonial thinking about social, political and governance reforms. However, the groundwork for future developments was already being put in place. For example, a visiting expert from England reported on social work education in the colony; the Working Group on Local Government was created shortly after the Star Ferry Riots in 1966; and the UFLS was launched the same year. In a general sense, all the initiatives were to address what was seen to be a "problem of people" — too many migrants over too short a period of time to too small an enclave with too little housing and infrastructure to accommodate this growth.[4] Government expected that peace in China would encourage a large reflow of migrants. By 1966, Britain recognized that this was not likely to happen. But care had to be taken in meeting the needs of the population, for there was a danger of turning the colony into a magnet drawing further large flows of in-migrants.

The result was a large population of unskilled workers competing for low-level jobs. Low wage levels contributed to the manufacturing sector's competitive advantage in world trade. But low wages also meant widespread poverty. The UFLS estimated that 700,000 people (18 percent of the population) were below the poverty line in 1967. Poverty, poor housing, and too few social services in a foreign-run colony in which residents lacked the franchise were issues that could no longer be ignored. These issues were defined in ways that are still relevant to Hong Kong today.

First, it was assumed that poverty and its associated deprivations were age-old conditions. Except in time of flood and famine, poverty was not a problem because the traditional Chinese family met the needs of its members according to traditional Chinese values, one component of the Chinese way. Second, it was assumed that the colony's rapid industrialization and urbanization somehow undercut traditional values and thereby weakened families. The very forces contributing to the colony's economic growth (urbanization and industrialization) created conditions threatening social stability. Weakened social controls would allow even minor disturbances to get out of hand. The resulting turmoil would discourage trade and investment, the basis for the colony's rapid economic growth. And even a relatively minor weakening of family helping-networks could create large numbers of desti-

tute elderly who would become dependent on government and NGO largesse. Meeting these new needs would, according to the critics, lead to a large welfare state that would in turn adversely affect government's positive non-intervention economic policy.

Since industrialization would continue and de-urbanization was not possible, traditional values and family helping-networks would become increasingly weak over time, while the tinderbox of social turmoil would heat up because social control in general would continue to decline.

Data, Conceptual and Analytical Challenges

Although the sponsors of the UFLS shared similar assumptions about Hong Kong's needs and their causes, the sponsors differed in their social philosophies and what they hoped the study would certify. Some foreign NGOs concentrated on emergency humanitarian assistance to the weakest members of society. Others saw a need to care for the dependent elderly. Some hoped to find justification for a cash public assistance program. Given the diversity of assumptions, philosophies and interests, it was agreed that the UFLS would concentrate on testing the assumptions behind these different perspectives. We were not to directly assess the likely impacts of specific alternative policy initiatives. Better information was needed on what the problems were and trends in them. The problems and approaches to them were informed by a number of policy questions, such as the likely future demands to be made on welfare agencies, an appropriate priority among competing needs, possible consequences that could be attributed to particular social and economic investments, the relative impacts of pre-migrant experiences and current living experiences, the meaning of poverty, the role that traditional values played in family life, and a number of other such interests.

Needless to say, many complex conceptual and methodological issues were addressed in the course of this research. They included definitions and measures of industrialization, urbaniza-

tion, the family, and both family and individual performance (strength). Some items were first or second-order independent (causal) variables; others were the dependent variables that the independent ones were to help explain — for example, withdrawal from family and work responsibilities in order to cope with the stresses associated with high-density housing. Furthermore, we were looking for plausible mechanisms or processes that led from cause to effect. The emphasis is on plausible, for we recognized that understanding cause-effect relations and the mechanisms linking the two are probably even today unreachable goals. Finally, relevant benchmarks were needed. These were provided by looking separately at different age groups and by comparing the Hong Kong findings with those from the separately-funded field surveys the author conducted in urban Thailand (Bangkok-Thomburi), Malaysia's five largest cities, Singapore, and Taipei.

Three series of large-scale sample surveys were conducted covering intact Hong Kong families (with special samples of both members of husband-wife pairs and the elderly), individuals in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia (with questions that overlapped the family survey), and Form 5 and 3 pupils in Hong Kong. More open-ended interviews, observation studies of young children and their mothers, content analyses of newspapers, and other inquiries were completed as well.[5] Extensive efforts were taken to reduce sampling, interviewer and measurement errors.[6]

Migration and Family Structure

An understanding of changes in families and the values that structure relations among family members must begin with the effects that migration had on population structure, size and growth. Rapid population growth created a backlog of housing and other needs. From 650,000 people in 1945 at the end of WWII, the colony grew to 3,834,000 in 1967, including 3,450,000 urban residents, the focus of the UFLS. The 88 percent growth rate in the 1950s

dropped to 33 percent in the 1960s. Except for about 350,000 illegal entrants that China tolerated from 1978 to 1980, the colony's subsequent population growth came from natural increase rather than from migrants.[7]

Hong Kong had the highest percentage of migrants in the urban areas we surveyed: 68 percent of the population spent most of their childhood between the ages of 5 and 12 outside Hong Kong. These migrants were almost as likely to have come from an urban area as from a farming village. A good proportion of them were already urbanized in some respects.

Migrants no doubt had a number of reasons for leaving China. Many probably fled, for 56 percent of the fathers of the adult migrants had been self-employed. This figure was even higher for migrants from larger cities.

Most migrants (62 percent) came as adults (age 18 or older). And perhaps because of the Japanese occupation of China and the turmoil of civil war, Hong Kong had the least educated work force in the region. Only 15 percent of the adults had completed their secondary education.

The welfare implications arising from this background of migration lightened over time. First, many migrants left their family-help networks behind. Thirty-seven percent of the sample of married adults had no sibling, aunt or uncle living in the colony to provide them assistance in time of need. This was a special problem for the elderly, as they were the least likely to have relatives resident in Hong Kong. We estimated that about 34,321 elderly could become dependent on private voluntary agencies or government for their care later in life.

Second, Hong Kong was well into the population transition process that would eventually lead to smaller families, although that would not become apparent until somewhat after 1967. According to Ronald Freedman, a University of Michigan demographer active in the region at the time, the age standardized birth rate declined 19 percent between 1961 and 1965. Most (89 percent) of the decline was explained by changes in the colony's age structure and an increase in the age at which women married (Freed-

man and Adlakha 1968; Mitchell 1971b, 1972e). Family-planning practices were up, which helped explain the remaining drop. Hong Kong's 1965 birthrate was higher than Singapore's and Taipei's, so that future drops seemed very likely.

Potential welfare needs declined in the years after 1967 because families set down their roots. Multigenerational family networks became more common. At the same time, increasing incomes meant that fewer people would be in need, and families would have relatively more resources, thereby enabling them to give assistance to their more distant relatives. *Major programs to address immediate needs in 1967 might very likely be difficult to justify in 1997.*

Positive Trends in Family Functioning

Population trends suggest changes in possible needs and opportunities for seeking and receiving assistance from family members. These trends are silent on how families function and the strength of helping networks.

It is necessary to define what is meant by a family and family strength (or functioning) in order to assess the implications that industrialization and urbanization had for this social unit. We focused primarily on husband-wife and parent-child relationships. Various (thoroughly pre-tested) questions tapped different dimensions of the strength of these bonds. Most significant was a measure of the frequency of husband-wife communications. Other questions dealt with couple behavior, emotional support spouses provided each other, happiness with one's marriage and life in general, etc. Similar measures were used for parent-child relationships, both parent-student and adult children with their adult parents. Still other questions provided information on the frequency of different kinds of contacts with relatives outside the immediate nuclear family.

One cannot tell if these measures mean anything unless those with different index scores also differ in patterned ways on family

and individual performance measures. We had a battery of these as well, including withdrawal from family and work responsibilities, failure to manage one's income, and other indicators of coping ability and efficiency in family decision-making. Based on work conducted elsewhere in the region and the United States, it was also possible to measure an individual's emotional strain level. These measures fit into a standard model of assumed causal linkages: stresses from urbanization and industrialization would affect individuals directly and also indirectly through their families and other social networks. The effects could range from superficial (e.g., happiness) to more severe emotional strain and then to behavioral withdrawal from family and work roles. Some of these linkages will be summarized later.

All our various measures found that husband-wife, parent-child and external family networks were getting stronger and likely to become even more so in the years ahead. Rising levels of education and income were driving these trends. Still, *Hong Kong had the weakest kinship networks in the region.* For example, among adults with relatives in the colony, 22 percent visited them two or three times a month or more. This contrasted with 56 percent reporting the same level of contacts among adults in the five largest (but still relatively small) Malaysian cities surveyed. These inter-country differences also challenged assumptions about the strength of traditional Chinese families: Chinese in all these countries (except Malaysia) had weaker ties than did their compatriot Thai, South Asian and Malay neighbors.

On the surface, it appeared that Hong Kong families continued to provide assistance to their elderly parents and other more distant relatives. But the forces underlying these assistance networks were changing. For example, in 1967, most adult children assumed residential responsibility for their older parents, especially their widowed mothers. Although sons were more likely to house an older parent, the traditional ideal of exclusive male responsibility for this function had changed, and along with the decline in the significance of exclusive male responsibility, there was also a decline in the responsibilities that first sons had for the

care of their parents. *Hong Kong families departed from the traditional model along a number of dimensions.*

Furthermore, Hong Kong kinship systems were also on their way to *bilateralism,* with 44 percent of daughters and 65 percent of sons giving money to their parents (among those with parents in Hong Kong). And although residential sharing with the husband's parents was the predominant pattern, sharing with the wife's parents was also found.

Parents received money gifts from more than one of their children, but the small amounts given suggested that these gifts were symbolic. This symbolism was absent for more distant relatives, as only half or less of our adult respondents with uncles, aunts, and siblings in the colony gave them presents at New Years.

These shifts in underlying patterns were likely to have important implications for social service agencies. In 1967, 5 percent of the respondents in the general population survey said that one of their family members had contact with a social welfare agency about a personal or family problem over the past two years. Most of the contacts were for economic assistance. Although a sizable minority of kinship networks were fairly weak, confirming the views held by social welfare agencies, still, 59 percent of the general adult population said they had "some relatives who can be counted on to see them through" a personal or family crisis.

Seeking outside assistance seemed to indicate family strength rather than weakness. Those in better marriages (e.g., as indicated by how happy they were with their marriage) were much more likely to seek assistance outside the family to help deal with various problems presented to our respondents. This suggested that as families had become stronger over time with rising levels of education and income, the portfolio of family needs would change as well. Instead of basic poverty-related needs, family members would seek assistance on problems more common to the middle classes in other countries. And it seemed likely that *families would be able to afford to pay for the services they sought.*

Could the trend toward stronger families reflect a trend toward stronger traditional Chinese values? Proponents of the Chinese Way and Asian values would seem to argue that there is nothing so basic as the family, and that if traditional values are not particularly important in this sphere, they may not be significant elsewhere. We will have more to say later on Chinese and Western values. Here we will be limited to fairly narrow but very significant kinship rules and religious identification.

Sinologists will rightly claim that it is difficult to conceptualize, measure and assess the impacts of the world views traditionally held by "the" Chinese. World views or comprehensive philosophies were defined by the learned men employed as bureaucrats under different dynasties. Robert Redfield's distinction between great and little traditions captures the world view gap between dynastic leaders and the popular classes. The current clash-of-cultures school seems to refer to great traditions. If the strength of the great tradition is built on the strength of the small, and if the small is changing, then one might argue that so-called Confucian ethics and the Asian Way are historical memories with little current relevance as guideposts for building a governance philosophy and system in present day Hong Kong — or China or Singapore. Leaders of ASEAN countries and Hong Kong seem to reflect the arguments of traditional (non-democratic) leaders in emphasizing that Asian values give central importance to consensus, obedience, and stability over individual political, civil, and economic rights.

Religious identification is one indicator of adherence to traditional Chinese beliefs. Hong Kong men had the lowest levels of religious identification in the region with 58 percent reporting they had no religion; less than 1 percent of Bangkok's population claimed no religion. Only 5 percent of adults in Hong Kong identified themselves as Buddhist.

Although ancestor worship may be more ritual than religion, 30 percent of Hong Kong adults identified themselves with this traditional practice. Being a Christian was not an insurmountable barrier to traditional rituals, as one-fourth of the Roman Catholics

and one-eighth of the Protestants identified themselves as ancestor worshippers. We measured and analyzed a number of practices — e.g., burning joss sticks and giving offerings at the family shrine — associated with this tradition.

Kinship institutions supported traditional ritual practices. Patrilineages had been larger and stronger in south than in north China, in part because they were based on multiple-cropped higher-yield rice lands.[8] These patrilineages owned common land, worshipped common ancestors, regulated the marriages of their members, and provided their members with various economic, welfare, and educational services. Strong patrilineages were authority structures that ordered the lives of families and their members. This was not a benign system, as some we interviewed reported that migrating to Hong Kong freed them from exploitation by more affluent patrilineage elders who required farmers to work the lineage lands in return for offerings of pork at major festivals. (Surrogate patrilineages in the form of "name" associations were found in urban Hong Kong, although these groups had little authority and provided few if any services.)

There were no doubt exceptions to this contrast between the old and new, but it was clear that the economy, technology, and labor market in Hong Kong were not supportive of traditional authority structures. Land reform in China itself no doubt had similar effects on these structures.

There was a clear trend away from tradition, as reflected by religious identification and various kinship rules. For example, arranged marriages (as measured at different points in the marriage process) were disappearing. Fifty-three percent of the married people age 60 or older had arranged marriages, whereas only 1 percent of those age 24 or younger had similar experiences. (There was no age trend in arranged marriages among the more educated wives.) Moreover, younger and better educated Hong Kong Chinese were the most likely to say they had no religion.

Contrary to what many Chinese and Westerners thought at the time, the trend away from selected traditional values and practices was not weakening nuclear and extended families. Members of what might

be called "modern" families had the highest levels of satisfaction with their marriages, were most likely to be involved in larger kinship networks, and were most likely to extend assistance to members of these networks. As educational and income levels rose over the years, one would expect a further weakening of tradition and a further strengthening of families (and, perhaps, an entirely new set of family-related problems and issues that social service agencies would promote).

These kinds of changes were already having subtle but significant impacts on the character-formation of Hong Kong youth. Family rearing practices were producing a new Hong Kong citizen, one who was more questioning of authority, more independent, and more assertive.

On the assumption (based on David McClelland's work (1961) popular at the time) that a modern economy required independent and assertive workers, we obtained the research cooperation of an American Friends Service-run nursery school catering to 3 to 6-year olds in an older resettlement estate to examine child-rearing practices and their effects. We used behavioral protocols to classify children according to criteria on assertiveness and independence. The teachers independently made their own classification, and based on the combined results, we interviewed in their homes the mothers of the five most and five least independent and assertive boys and the same for girls. The focus was on mother-child relations according to their permissiveness, freedom, amount of communications, and harshness of the discipline employed.

We concluded from this small exploratory study that:

> Independent and assertive behavior in children seems to be associated with the presence of mothers who are permissive rather than restrictive, who permit the child to verbally participate in adult conversation rather than closet him in his own segregated world, and who are less harsh and punitive in the disciplining techniques they use. In addition, these children have mothers who set high standards of achievement for them and also encourage them to compete with other children rather

> than fit neatly into a structure of harmonious inter-personal relations.

> Independence and assertiveness are important within the Chinese setting of Hong Kong, for they provide children with a new, non-traditional approach to handling the problems of life. In contrast to the emphasis on harmony, order, and adjusting oneself to the unbendable ways of nature, the new approach is producing children who compete with one another, disregard relationships between superior and inferior, and strive to master the world rather than adjust to it. (Mitchell 1968d)

The subsequent surveys of families and of Form 5 students extended this exploratory work and, we think, confirmed the above interpretation.

We predicted that the new Hong Kong family "may be producing a new generation of children who are not fitted by temperament and need for the kinds of institutions awaiting them when they become adults. In this sense, the family may be subtly forecasting and creating changes in the future life of the community" (Mitchell 1968d).

There is certainly a great deal more to economic growth than cultural values, personal character, and the family and educational institutions supportive of these values and personality types. Still, it does not hurt to have the different institutions in sync with one another. And the current rulers of Hong Kong might be advised to recognize that they are sitting on top of a people who in several fundamental ways are different from the "traditional" Chinese and from a good portion of the people in China itself. It is not a question of the visogoths ruling the Romans, but there are potentially significant institutionally-based differences between China's communist-appointed leaders and the Hong Kong people they rule.

Colonialism's Economic Legacy: The Human Side

Hong Kong's open economy, its legal and institutional infrastructure, its location on the China coast: all contributed to the colony's economic success and transformation. At the time of its return to China, Hong Kong was estimated to account for 18 percent of the new one-country's total national income.[9]

Refugee Shanghainese businessmen were commonly (and incorrectly) credited with the initial growth of manufacturing. Tung Chee-hwa, the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, is Shanghainese — which typically means he speaks the Wu dialect and is either from Kiangsu or Chekiang. The Shanghai influence was limited primarily to the textile sector, although this sector also had an important impact on banking practices in the colony. Because of the trade embargo of China during and after the Korean War, the demand for credit dropped. This forced banks to accommodate to the term-lending arrangements the Shanghainese had obtained in China. The resulting changes benefited the cascade of new and expanding enterprises that came on the scene in later years (Wong 1984).

This growth was a continuation of entrepreneurial initiatives by the Cantonese (Hong Kong-born and migrants). The number of registered industrial undertakings rose from 1,525 in 1950 to 5,135 in 1960 and 9,303 in 1966.[10] Manufacturing employment increased from 89,512 in 1950 to 376,711 in 1966, from 43 to 47 percent of the colony's total 1966 work force. Textiles, shipbuilding, fish, artificial flowers, and wigs were the largest sub-sectors. In a study we did on *The Needs of Hong Kong Manufacturing Industry for Higher Level Manpower*, we found that 323 manufacturing firms employed 200 or more workers (Mitchell 1968a).

Manufacturing-led economic growth depended on a large, easily-accessed (urbanized), and unskilled labor force. Larger employers depended on university graduates for their higher level manpower (with universities outside the colony supplying most of this talent). Today, Hong Kong is much more dependent on skilled high level manpower for its financial, service and trade economy, although about one fifth (18.9 percent in 1996) of the total labor force is still in manufacturing, only five percentage points less than the 1931 employment figure of 24 percent.[11]

These labor force and labor market changes suggest that some of the research findings from 1967 are only of historical interest today. The colony's economic growth certainly raised personal incomes and reduced poverty. This was a significant colonial legacy. Still, our 1967 studies point to some of the effects that working conditions had on employees and their families, as well as the consequences that might be expected if Hong Kong's economy suffers significant downturns in the years ahead.

Employees put in long work days and work weeks; their jobs and income were insecure; their pay was low. These conditions adversely affected families and their members. Fifty-eight percent of the employed put in a 7-day week; 52 percent worked 10 hours a day or longer; and nearly one-third of all wives held jobs. These working conditions reduced the extent to which people were involved in their more extended family networks. Subsequent laws limiting hours of work very likely had positive implications for families.

All this work yielded a monthly median personal income of about US$51 and a mean of around $73. (New Year bonuses, which 36 percent received, are not included in these figures.) One source estimated per capita GNP at US$313 in 1965, a far cry from today's US$27,500 (with or without adjustments for inflation).[12] A large proportion of the colony's 1967 work force and families was poor. Their incomes were insecure as well: 47 percent of the bottom income quartile reported their jobs were insecure. Even 20 percent of the top quartile had this insecurity.

Poor people were certainly aware of their poverty. They were the most likely to feel deprived, to worry over money, and to spend more than they earned. Given the income and occupational structure of the time, one might have (incorrectly) assumed that the poor were forever condemned to their poverty and that there was a self-perpetuating poverty cycle.

Poverty, felt deprivation, job insecurity, money worries, and spending more than one earned adversely affected individuals and their families. The poor were the most likely to argue with their spouse about money. And people suffering from the above stresses registered the highest levels of emotional strain and withdrawal from their family responsibilities. Also, although the poor and least educated were most in need of various types of outside assistance, they were the least likely to seek outside help or expect that someone would provide it.

We were able to examine how individuals and families were affected by three sets of influences: *structural* (including rising income and educational levels), *life cycle* (age, including the age at marriage and number of children), and *situational* (including the length of the work day and work week). All three influences affected family strength, but income and education were especially important. Husband-wife communication, couple behavior, personal happiness, happiness with one's marriage, and involvement in larger kin groups increased as we went up the class ladder.

Based on the constellation of these economic-related stresses in peoples' lives, one might expect Hong Kong to have had high levels of emotional strain and withdrawal from both family and work responsibilities. This is certainly what many expected the UFLS to document, and there was confirming evidence at a rather superficial level. For example, 33 percent of the colony's adults were quite or very unhappy, more than twice the level (15 percent) reported for Taipei and four times that for Singapore and Bangkok. Hong Kong adults (especially women) had the highest level of self-reported poor or fair health. However, our indices of emotional strain and role withdrawal placed Hong Kong much lower in the regional rankings. More than industrialization and urbanization affected inter-country and ethnic differences.

One among several reasons for this unexpected ranking may lie in the greater ability of Chinese to manage their poverty, as reflected in answers to a question on how often the respondent's expenditures exceeded income. Fifty percent of the Thai men in

Bangkok, in contrast to 29 percent of Hong Kong men, said this happened once every three or four months or more often. At every level of family income in Bangkok, the Chinese were better financial managers than their Thai neighbors. *The apparent comparative advantage Chinese had in managing their finances in general and poverty in particular helped protect families and their members from some of the expected consequences of poverty.* That is, poverty was less likely to become a more serious crisis.

Hong Kong's rising levels of education and income, together with expanded government-supported social services, no doubt have been able to build on the strengths of the Chinese in coping with their poverty. We will see later, however, that the same forces that helped reduce poverty and its effects are likely to have removed some of the constraints inhibiting organized protests against felt economic and political injustices.

Social and Moral Aspects of Housing

Tung Chee-hwa announced that further expansion of Hong Kong's housing programs would be a priority for his administration. The exiting colonial administration set a 1995-2001 target of 511,000 new flats (195,000 private housing, 141,000 public rental, and 175,000 subsidized sale units).[13] Tung's target is the same, 85,000 new houses a year, with 70 percent ownership within a decade (*The Economist* July 5th-11th 1997, p. 35).

Publicly-assisted housing in the colony began as an accidental initiative. The early crush of in-migration put the colony on the road to becoming overrun by squatter settlements when a Christmas eve fire in 1953 made 53,000 squatters homeless. Government responded with the first of a series of basic housing provided in Mark I and II resettlement estates. By 1968, nearly 1.2 million people, or 26 percent of the colony's total population, lived in this housing. One estate housed 117,000 of a planned 175,000 tenant population for it. Over the years, government provided progressively improved accommodations and, through a low-cost hous-

ing society and authority scheme, housing for the non-poor. Still, large numbers of people were poorly housed in the 1960s. The 1961 census estimated that 726,577 persons lived in "gravely inadequate" accommodations.[14]

Social service agencies were not in a position to do much in meeting the massive housing needs, but these groups and government saw high density and squalor as socially destructive forces in the lives of residents and their families. The urbanization twin to the industrialization and urbanization problem was largely a housing matter.

As in other countries (including the United States), housing problems and solutions were and are complicated by moral judgments, levels of amenities provided, neighborhood and urban design, and serious cost constraints. Both building and housing codes manipulate the physical and social environments shaping family living. And in providing housing, the Hong Kong authorities were also designing and building a city. The effects that these physical, social, and design features had on people in the colony in 1967 should be relevant to housing decisions the current administration makes.

High densities were the result of what many saw to be the colony's "people problem." The large migrant influx made Hong Kong's urban population the third largest Chinese and the fifth largest Asian city in 1967. The urbanized area of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, New Kowloon and Tsuen Wan (in the New Territories) covered 35,101 acres, only about 10,748 of which were devoted to residential, commercial, and industrial purposes to house and employ nearly 3.5 million urban residents. We estimated that urban-wide residential densities fell within the range of 415 to 466 people per acre, equivalent to between 265,000 and 290,000 per square mile. There were wide inter-neighborhood differences. In 1961, 13 census divisions had more than 2,000 people per acre. One large resettlement estate had 4,100 per acre. These were high by standards adopted in other countries. In Finland, for example, the recommended density for new develop-

ments was 25 to 37 persons per acre, while it was 125 persons per acre in Italy.

High ground-level densities reflected high dwelling-unit densities. The sample of Hong Kong adults found the median dwelling unit had 400 square feet, giving 43 square feet per person. Bangkok had twice the amount of space per capita, and Malaysian urban residents had over three times this amount. These densities were again high by the cultural standards adopted by other countries. The expert consensus in European countries at the time was that a minimum of 170 square feet of floor space per person was essential for mental health. The American Public Health Association set the desirable standard at twice the European figure in 1950 (Mitchell 1970, 1972d, 1974b, 1974c).

Since space was limited for almost all functions, it is not surprising that 28 percent of the Hong Kong population slept three or more to a bed; 13 percent slept four or more.

A typical Chinese flat in a private building was partitioned (but not necessarily up to the ceiling) into a number of small rooms, many without the benefit of cross-ventilation. This arrangement helps explain why the colony's dwelling units had more rooms than found in Singapore, for example. A single family, however, had only a portion of the larger space. They shared their units with others. Thirty-nine percent of our Hong Kong adult sample shared their dwelling unit with non-kinsmen, whereas this was true for only 15 percent of our respondents in Singapore. The average married couple lived in a dwelling unit with 8.5 people; the units of 15 percent of married couples had 16 or more people.

Such arrangements were historically freighted with moral judgments, especially in Western countries. For example, L. Veiller, author of the first New York Tenement Housing Act, defended a code on boarders as follows:

> Room overcrowding is bound up with another social problem, namely the lodger evil. This prevails chiefly among the foreign elements of the population.... It is fraught with danger to the social fabric of the country. It

means the undermining of family life; often breaking down of domestic standards. It frequently leads to the breaking up of homes and families, to the downfall and subsequent degraded career of young women, to grave immoralities — in a word, to the profanation of the home. (Grad 1970)

Sponsors of the UFLS, government officials and other leaders in the colony no doubt shared similar views and moral judgments.

High densities and doubling-up were two components of a larger picture of housing deprivations, for those with the least space were also least likely to have tap water, a flush toilet, or cross-ventilation. People suffered these conditions because they could not afford better accommodations. *Physical, social, and economic deprivations overlapped one another.*

Despite their reputation for personal cleanliness, Chinese throughout Southeast Asia seemed to have contributed to their poor living environments by taking less good care of the interior of their dwelling units. We trained our international teams of interviewers to use a number of criteria to subjectively rate the level of care of the interiors of homes they visited. ("Excellent" care was "exceptionally clean, neat, well-ordered.") Chinese families throughout the region were more likely to live in self-made squalor. Seventy percent of the Hong Kong dwelling units were rated poor ("obviously needing house cleaning, things strewn about...") or very poor ("very dirty, badly littered..."). (Low-cost housing interiors were rated much higher.) Inter-ethnic differences were not explained by family class standing.

When aggregated at the street and neighborhood level, this relatively low level of care presented a potential public health hazard. However, I cannot recall that there were serious solid waste and disorder problems, ones certainly not near to what I found in Cairo, Egypt, during my five years living and working in that city. Urban sanitary services seem to have helped compensate for Hong Kong's family-specific messiness. If this was so, it suggests that the current government (or any government in a Chinese community) needs an effective urban services program.

Singapore provides such services but also employs strict controls over littering, laundry-drying on public housing balconies, and, even (as I seem to recall) chewing gum.

It is not surprising that the colony's publicly-assisted housing programs were well received and that Hong Kong's current government wishes to expand them. "Better" housing meant more space and more amenities at the same or lower rent.

Ground squatters preferred to move to a resettlement estate; but the major preference for all others was for low-cost housing. Both types offered subsidies. Families in private buildings paid 20 percent of their family income on rent; low-cost housing tenants paid 13 percent, and those in resettlement estates paid 10 percent. (Government today reports a "median rent-to-income ratio" that "represents, on average, 8.5 percent of the median household income of Housing Authority tenants" in 1995.[15] This mixture of medians and averages reminds one of Yogi Berra's approach to baseball: "90 percent of this game is half-mental.") Median family incomes were about the same for residents in private and low-cost housing, but the median rent of the former was 58 percent higher than that for the latter. Since low-cost housing provided more and better services and amenities, their tenants in fact received even a deeper subsidy.

Higher-quality government-assisted housing cuts into the private market. Those living in private housing and wanting to move to another private building were willing to pay nearly twice their current rents. If Hong Kong's new government intends to expand housing opportunities, it should keep in mind the distinction between *obtaining* and *providing* these services.

Hong Kong's living environment seemed to be a human parallel to the behavioral sink discovered by US National Institute of Mental Health scientist John Calhoun in his laboratory studies of Norway rats confined in high-density pens.[16] Since men, like rats, occupy space, it was reasonable to assume that the amount and organization of this space would significantly affect human behavior.

Because of its high density, the colony should have had the highest levels of emotional strain and role withdrawal in Southeast Asia. It did not. This unexpected finding raised further questions about what it was about the colony's people that allowed them to cope so well with their living environments, their low-paid insecure jobs, and their poverty.

I add "further questions" because I was struck early on by the absence of odd or deranged behavior on the street (compared to what I observed on New York streets and subways over a number of years). I also found normal behavior to be interesting. For example, during my frequent walks, especially up Nathan Road in Mongkok from my office to the Vice Chancellor's, I often saw a hawker affectionately lift his toddler up in the air, but they never verbally communicated with one another. On the hunch that many residents had developed an affect prophylactic to protect themselves from the bombardment of stimuli around them, we obtained the cooperation of the colony's one mental hospital (in Castle Peak) to review their case records. They were not revealing. (We found patients who claimed that Chinese communists planted radio receivers in their heads and were sending them nasty messages.) One clue to inter-group differences came from our Southeast Asian surveys. We gave our respondents every opportunity to answer "don't know" to questions asked them; we did not want to force opinions on the respondents. South Asians (different groups from India and the then-Ceylon) gave very few "don't knows." They were a loquacious group, whereas "don't knows" were relatively higher among the much more reticent Chinese. Reticence was perhaps an indicator of an affective shield against emotional stress.

Despite such a shield, Hong Kong residents living in the highest density dwelling units had the highest levels of complaints about lack of space and privacy. Sharing arrangements, regardless of density, also increased these complaints. But contrary to commonsense arguments on the socially and personally destructive consequences of high-density housing, we found that floor level and sharing were the only significant negative influences. As subsequently reported in *The American Sociological Review*,

> Although high densities and other physical features of housing do not affect deeper levels of strain, the social features of housing have an important impact on these strains. More importantly, the doubling-up of non-related households tends to create stressful situations, especially if it is difficult for the household members to easily escape each other by retreating outdoors. It is more difficult to retreat in this way when the dwelling unit is on an upper floor of a multistory building. Therefore, multistory buildings, when combined with sharing arrangements, can have negative effects on the emotional health of individuals. These effects, it is conjectured, probably arise from forced interaction among non-relatives, not from high densities or large numbers of fellow kinsmen. Large numbers of people in high density housing can be tolerated more easily if these people are one's kinsmen.

> Although the various housing conditions have no apparent effect on patterns of husband-wife interaction, densities have a clear impact on parent-child relationships. Parents in high-density housing evidently do not discourage their children from leaving the house, thereby temporarily relieving the high densities. But this solution to high densities tends to reduce the parents' knowledge of and control over their children.

> High density housing also discourages interaction and friendship practices among neighbors and friends.[17]

The destructive force was not density; it was *congestion*, the demand for the simultaneous use of very limited resources (space and amenities). Congestion can be mitigated through both social and design solutions. Housing codes are social in nature. Government discouraged (or prohibited) sharing arrangements in public housing, and relatively few families in this housing did share.

Design and social solutions shifted attention from a residential building to the larger environment in which it was placed. Resettlement and other estates were juxtaposed cheek-to-jowl along with flatted factories. This resulted in a mixture of residen-

tial, commercial, and industrial uses. High-density, mixed land-use, especially in popular neighborhoods, helped explain the sense of energy and life in Hong Kong. (Cairo, Egypt, another large, high-density urban area, never seemed to have given me the same uplift that Hong Kong did.)

In the language of University of California-Berkeley urban planner Richard L. Meier (a frequent visitor to the colony during my tenure there), Hong Kong was an outstanding example of resource-conserving urban growth. High density, mixed land-use meant that public transportation had a large proportion of short trips and a high number of passengers per vehicle mile. According to a transportation consultant's report in 1967, peak-hour travel accounted for less than 10 percent of the total daily transportation. The four peak hours handled 29 percent of Hong Kong's riding, whereas the figure was around 60 percent for developed Western cities. Except for construction workers and those with higher incomes, most people lived fairly close to their place of employment (Freeman et al. 1967).

What do these findings have to say to Hong Kong today? Housing was seen not to have the widespread, disturbing effects that we expected. However, there is little doubt that colonialism's housing legacy improved the peoples' quality of life. The opportunity cost of government's inaction would have been a massive squatter city with repetitions of the Christmas 1953 fire and other disasters. The current challenge is not so much whether to continue a housing program but, instead, what level of quality to provide and for whom, who provides it, what costs the beneficiaries should cover, how it should be managed, and how the larger urban area should be designed to support a suitable living environment and assure that the urban economy operates efficiently.

This larger urban design context means that housing is a public good as well as a private one. Government needs to broaden its view beyond financial rates of return on individual housing projects to include economic rates of return for investments in the larger urban environment.

And a broader view of the economy is needed to include the consequences of removing prime land from the land-auction system that in 1967 produced a sizable minority of government revenues (but which no doubt are relatively less important today).[18] Moreover, government needs to distinguish between *effective housing demand* and *need*. As their incomes rise, families will want to enjoy improved accommodations as well as validate their success with a higher quality of life. We have seen that these people, especially those wishing to move to private housing, are willing to pay a higher proportion of their incomes on their shelter services. Deep subsidies for an increasingly affluent population do not make fiscal or social sense. Similarly, private sector investment in housing projects will free up government resources to address other social and economic issues.

Given the findings on how well families take care of their housing, government will also need to evolve management strategies that will reduce short and long-term maintenance costs. British housing reformers found one such solution in the strict approach followed by Octavia Hill. Singapore seems to have adopted a somewhat similar management style. However, creating the "clean poor" by putting them in good housing will not break the chains of poverty. Good housing is not a substitute for economic growth. This suggests that Hong Kong may be advised to give education a relatively higher priority than housing in the years ahead.

Western Colonialism and Perceived Cultural Superiority

Hong Kong has been called an economy, not a country. On the basis of their entrepreneurial backgrounds, it is likely that a large proportion of residents were repulsed more by China than they were attracted to the colony. Although only a relatively small number of residents were able to obtain British passports and declare their loyalty to the crown, security, freedom and income-

earning opportunities were open to all. Still, Hong Kong was a colony ruled by foreigners. By 1967, it was Britain's last major colony at the close of worldwide transition from colonialism to independence. Hong Kong's residents were placed in an uncomfortable position of being ruled by foreigners while Chinese nationalism was active next door.

The UFLS was not intended to consider colonialism and other political issues. However, we were able to obtain information on some related topics from our survey of secondary school pupils, Hong Kong's then-future elite.

Britain was aware of the negative connotations of foreign colonialism. As in its other colonies, the authorities considered the Chinese to be natives and properly the responsibility of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs (so named in 1913; it was formerly the Registrar General, an office dating to 1844). The Social Welfare Department was under this office.

The colonial government took steps to remove some of the symbols of its rule. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs was renamed the Secretary for Home Affairs in 1969; the term "territory" was substituted for "colony" in 1975, along with the elevation of the Chinese language to a new status at the same time; and the Colonial Secretary was renamed the Chief Secretary in 1976. (The CS car license plate could stay the same.) My appointment in 1966 to direct the UFLS also helped deflect criticism of British colonialism. One left-wing paper commented on this by saying it was typical of the British to hire an American to study the Chinese.

Changing these symbols was unlikely to quickly (if ever) alter the underlying attitudes the rulers and ruled had toward each other. Although I cannot recall any expatriate civil servant treating the Chinese in an arrogant manner (that is, any more arrogantly that some treated their own colleagues), one ex-District Officer married to a Chinese woman has recounted in print the superiority feelings of his fellow officers.[19] Chinese students reciprocated these feelings with their own sense of superiority. Exactly half the students we surveyed felt that most Chinese were more

intelligent than most Westerners. Only 2 percent gave the advantage to Westerners.

Chinese students who felt superior had to play by the English rules for career success. These rules helped broaden students' intellectual and life-style horizons. Regardless of their class background and academic performance, Form 5 students knew that English-language competency was one key to their career success. In response to the question "In order to get ahead in Hong Kong today, which of the following subjects should students do best in school," 57 percent selected the English language, twice the proportion of the second-rated subject, science. Nearly 70 percent of the students in Chinese-stream schools gave priority to the English language. (Most students needed much more language practice, as only 53 percent of the Form 5 pupils in academic Anglo-Chinese schools were able to understand most of English-language films without reading the subtitles. A mere 15 percent of the students in the Chinese stream had this high a level of competence.)

Students also favored Western life styles over traditional Chinese ones: 84 percent preferred Western movies over Chinese, 76 percent preferred Western over Chinese clothes, and 62 percent preferred Western over Chinese music. Only 9 percent selected all three Chinese options, whereas slightly over half selected all three Western choices. Furthermore, Chinese students were attracted to Western education. Only 42 percent preferred to continue their studies in the colony. The United States (26 percent) and Canada (17 percent) were the choice of those who were certain they would attend a university. Finally, Hong Kong's future elite had minimal commitment to the colony. Only one out of five students answered "stay in Hong Kong" to the question: "If you could live anywhere today, where would you most prefer to live?"

This ambivalence of feeling superior to Westerners but preferring Western over what some might categorize as traditional Chinese life styles and thinking carried over to views of Hong Kong's colonial status. First, nearly 40 percent agreed that "Western influence has been bad for Hong Kong." (Those with these anti-West

views were more likely to agree that "the Vietcong are right in fighting against the South Vietnamese Government." Twenty-eight percent of the boys, three times the level for girls, gave this response. It seems that more than political and economic radicalism are captured by these positions on the Vietnamese war, as the four schools with the highest rates of support for the Vietcong included one run by the Roman Catholics, two were Protestant-sponsored, and the fourth was one of the colony's better government schools.) Even more (71 percent) felt that government did not understand the "needs of the people in Hong Kong" ("not too well" or "not at all"). About the same percentage (69 percent) disagreed with the "policies and administration of the Hong Kong government."

What were the political alternatives to colonialism? And how urgent was it to implement these alternatives? Students seemed to have been fairly realistic in their views of the downside of life in China. Only 1 percent preferred attending a post-secondary school there, and Taiwan was not very popular either (7 percent). The present system could be improved within the colonial context. Only one-third of the students agreed that "Hong Kong would be much better off if it were independent." (We did not ask whether they preferred Hong Kong to remain a colony or to return to China.) Even fewer, 18 percent, said that "radical social and economic changes will be needed for Hong Kong to develop as it should." Another 63 percent agreed that such changes were needed "but not immediately." There was little support to taking to the streets to force change. Only (or fully) 28 percent agreed that "the Kowloon rioters this past year were right in what they did." (This referred to the 1966 protests against an increase in first-class tolls by the Star Ferry Company.)

Hong Kong's future elite held Western orientations, felt intellectually equal to or superior to Westerners, and many thought that Western influence had been bad for the colony. Changes were needed, but not necessarily radical ones, and there was no apparent need for immediate change. It seemed that the colonial government would have an elite it could cooperate with in democratizing and reform-

ing government in the years ahead. In 1967, however, members of this future elite were still young students, a small minority of the total population. The larger population suffered poverty, insecurity, and difficult living environments. Of course, students came from this same environment, although they tended to come from relatively better-off families and were no doubt much more Western-oriented. Forces supportive of stability and democracy in one group need not have been the same for the other.

For students, we are able to explore their views about the influence the Chinese community had over the colony's policies, and, also, the likelihood that students would participate in democratic processes. Because we did not make similar inquiries in our general population surveys, we suggest reasons why the migrant-dominated labor force did not support mass anti-colonial, pro-China movements.

Democracy, Social Capital, and Money, Money, Money

Velvet colonialism maximized freedom but minimized democracy. Beginning with Mark Young in 1946, it seemed that every governor had his own never-implemented democracy plan. (The colony's second post-WWII governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, had an American wife.) To some, popular elections did not make much sense when policy-making positions were filled by government-appointed officials and non-official representatives who swore loyalty to the crown. Today's Hong Kong seems to be reverting to the executive-center government characteristic of the colony in 1967. What passed as a constitution at that time were the Letters Patent, Royal Instructions, and Colonial Regulations, documents silent on fundamental rights and liberties of the residents.

The Executive and Legislative Councils were the chief advisory bodies, the latter with appointed unofficials. In addition, the Urban Council (created in 1936 in a transformation of the Sanitary Board established in 1887) offered a limited franchise. According

to official estimates in 1966, between 200,000 and 300,000 people were eligible to register to vote for members of this council (the elected representatives were outnumbered by official and appointed members). In the 1967 elections, 26,275 actually registered to vote but only 10,189 went to the polls.[20]

Government also managed the emergence of organized citizen groups by requiring they register and thereby be subject to legal controls. Peaceful picketing and demonstrations were also controlled by requiring the organizers to obtain prior approval from the police. Even tenant associations were discouraged, although this policy was reversed in the 1970s as part of a crime-control strategy (Scott 1989, pp. 142-43). Government was aware that groups at any level and with any purpose could be infiltrated by criminal (triad) and disruptive political elements. The 1956 riots demonstrated the dangers ever-present in Hong Kong.[21]

To many observers, July 1, 1997 marked the beginning of a return to a more traditional and fairly recent system of controls over opportunities for popular voice and choice. Again, today's ex-colony has an executive-dominated political and governance system.

Students in 1967 recognized that the colony's executive-centered government did not preclude a policy-making role for the Chinese. Fifty-one percent said that the leaders of the Chinese community in the colony had a fair or great deal of influence upon the government's policies and activities. On its part, Government emphasized that it governed by consensus and consent. Others criticized this arrangement as government by worthies. The worthies were successful businessmen, but this did not mean they disregarded the needs of the larger population. As noted above, many students felt that this type of government had mixed results.

We asked several standard questions that tapped a sense of personal and group efficacy. Except for their pessimism about reducing corruption in government, the sample was not so pessimistic about the ability of groups of individuals, clubs and private citizens to help reduce the drug problem (61 percent at least "a fair

amount"), improve the educational system (63 percent), and obtain better services for local neighborhoods (74 percent). Only 33 percent were similarly hopeful about reducing corruption in government, an area where there was in fact significant success over the years. As noted earlier, there was a much greater sense of helplessness in the general population regarding their own economic and career future. Fifty-three percent of the adult sample said they had little control over the course of their life, whereas only 15 percent of the Bangkok adults felt this way.

Students had a similarly mixed commitment to their civic responsibilities. When asked if they would tell the police if they saw various incidents, 70 percent said they would do so if they saw a man peddling drugs, 45 percent if they saw someone stealing a coat, and 32 percent if they saw a man beating his wife.

Hong Kong's future elite was prepared to participate in future democratic reforms. Sixty-two percent said they would vote in an election if they were given the chance to register. The likelihood of voting increased with a rise in the sense of personal and group efficacy (as measured by an index tapping the underlying dimensions). The colony's adult population in 1967 was not similarly motivated. Less than 1 percent of those age 21 or over voted in the Urban Council elections held in June 1967. Taking advantage of the limited franchise was not the only option they had to express their hopes and fears. They could have joined the Star Ferry protesters in 1966 or the communist ones in 1967.

Although it is not possible to explain why something did not happen, we have some possible candidate-reasons why there was so little support for the protesters and why participation in democracy increased over the years — and why it may be difficult for Hong Kong's current rulers to suppress demands for democracy.

There are three sets of possible explanations. First, the population seemed to have accepted the rules of the economic game with regard to what was important and why they were personally not successful. Second, the Chinese community was organizationally weak. In the current social science parlance, there was little social

capital. Third, this social capital deficit was part of a larger institutional structure that was not supportive of democratic governance. This institutional weakness also contributed to the colonial administration's complacency about needs and opportunities for change.

Given the colony's low wages and widespread poverty, it is not surprising that a majority of adults felt they were on the bottom of the class ladder. Sixty percent of the adult population identified themselves as belonging to the lower or the lower middle class, well ahead of the second-place Malaysians (33 percent) and the last (first!)-place Bangkok urban population (23 percent). Furthermore, over half of Hong Kong workers said their jobs were low or below-average in prestige, a sharp contrast to only 6 percent of the Bangkok Thai who felt this way. *Hong Kong workers were not only at the bottom. They saw little opportunity to climb higher. To many, they were at the dead end of their job and income prospects.* Only 16 percent felt there was a great deal or quite a bit of opportunity for them to be a success in their career. At the other extreme, 71 percent of the Bangkok urban sample were optimistic about their prospects.

There was not much meaning to jobs that many workers were stuck with. Only one quarter of the work force said they liked their job very much. Malays, Indians, and Thai were all more positive than Chinese about their work. It is not surprising that two-fifths of the Hong Kong sample wanted to get into some other kind of work.

While 41 percent said they were dissatisfied with what they had achieved in life, they seemed to have accepted the essential justice of the economy's job-based reward structure. Only one quarter of the adults thought that a person with their qualifications in their jobs should earn more than they were personally receiving. Most workers felt they got what they deserved; they just did not have either the qualifications or the job that would warrant more money. That is, *very few felt they were exploited*; the more educated were most likely to feel this way.

What did these people want out of their work, what kept them going, and how did this contribute to the economy's rapid growth? Hong Kong workers in 1967 held values that Deng Xiaoping implied were absent among workers in communist China. According to Deng, Chinese had to realize that "to get rich is glorious." Sinologists might argue that this materialistic value is a significant departure from the traditional virtues of the scholarly bureaucratic class. Pre-modern China was said to have a hierarchy of occupational prestige and values contrary to the development of Western-style capitalism. Government officials were at the top rung of society; soldiers were at the bottom, with merchants just ahead of them. And instead of work, money and efficiency values in support of an economy, primacy was given to filial piety, obedience and other Confucian virtues.

Hong Kong workers were ahead of Deng, as reflected in answers to the question about what they most liked about their work. Even though they had low incomes, 56 percent selected the income aspect. Bangkok and Malaysian Chinese were close behind with the same choice, but Taipei and Singapore Chinese found other more rewarding things in their work.

The colony's work force appeared to have anomalous values and perspectives. A large proportion saw themselves at the bottom of the class and prestige ladder; they felt they failed in their careers and there was little opportunity to change their life conditions; 41 percent were dissatisfied with what they had achieved in their lives; satisfaction seemed to refer to the money they had, which was not much; this was a low-income labor force working long hours and long work weeks; yet they accepted the reward structure and, in fact, only (or fully) one-third were dissatisfied with their present living conditions, perhaps a low percentage because of their relatively greater ability to manage their finances.

There did not seem to be an environment supportive of class-based political action. A good majority accepted their fates. Only 27 percent said it was very important to them "personally to be successful and a person of achievement." Singapore's Chinese and

non-Chinese gave much greater weight (43 percent) to being successful.

The above account is based on information collected from and about individuals, although this information was aggregated to give urban-wide rates. Information from individuals can also be used to indicate the quality of social relations in different sectors and levels of society. In this regard, the colony's vibrant street and economic life was not built on strong neighborhood-level social ties, a further weakness muting political and economic demands on government and employers. Government used the Societies Ordinance to control organized groups so that outside political and inside criminal groups could not use these organizations for disruptive purposes. There was minimal social capital, a term Robert Putnam popularized in his various studies (e.g., his article on *Bowling Alone in America* and his longitudinal research on political and governance developments in Italy).[22] Based on the earlier work of sociologist James Coleman, social capital has accumulated multiple meanings, including prestige, formal and informal social networks, and a sense of both group and personal efficacy.

We had several indicators of the low level of social capital in 1967. As measured by the absence of close friends, social contacts with neighbors, getting along well with co-workers, and contacts with one's kinsmen, Hong Kong had the region's weakest social networks. For example, one-third of the colony's adults said they had no close friend. Taipei and Singapore were second with 18 percent, and only 13 percent of Malaysians were friendless. (Hong Kong women were especially isolated in this way.) Whereas 64 percent of the Bangkok adults saw their co-workers once every two weeks or more often, only 37 percent of the Hong Kong workers had this high a level of contact (5 percent higher than Taipei workers). And whereas half or more of the workers in every urban area except Hong Kong "got along very well with co-workers," only 37 percent of Hong Kong workers had this same level of comity. Similar differences in contacts with relatives were noted earlier.

Government was aware that its strategy on social capital had mixed results. On the one hand, China-oriented political parties and colony-based criminal elements were discouraged, resulting in social and political stability, at least until 1966. On the other hand, legally registered neighborhood groups (especially the Kaifongs), the unofficial members of the Legislative and Urban Councils, and other approved groups were not seen to have been effective in countering the 1966-67 street disturbances.[23] Although the Working Group on Local Administration created in 1966 did not recommend that government address challenges to community organization and governance structures by adopting the traditional colonial system of indirect rule through District Officers (that were operating in the New Territories), government introduced in the urban areas City District Officers (CDOs) to close the gap between it and the governed. Each of the initial ten CDOs was responsible for 300,000 people. According to the Colonial Secretary, "these men are intended to be political officers, in the sense that the District Officer is in the New Territories, whom they will in many ways resemble as political officers." They had no executive power but were expected to explain government policy to residents, reduce the perceived gap between government and the people, market the services of government departments, and facilitate their implementation (Mitchell 1968c; Bray 1968).

The traditional district officer scheme in British colonies was based in part on the assumed presence of fairly inclusive, locally authoritative social groups through which indirect rule should take place. These groups in Hong Kong were weak for the reasons already mentioned, which meant that the CDOs would have to create them, as they helped do. Although I have not seen evaluations of the CDO program, I understand that it was much more successful than one might have expected. Skeptics might say that the CDOs were another example of colonial top-down consensus-building. Others would probably agree with Deng Xiaoping's statement that it does not matter what color the cat is so long as it catches mice.

A number of forces were beginning to change the colony's institutional infrastructure in ways that could not be forecast in 1967. We have already seen that the educational system and changes in family relations were contributing to this institutional transformation. Parents may have adjusted to their own lack of success, but they had high aspirations for their children. For example, 41 percent of the family sample said it was very important to them personally that their children be successful and people of achievement, a level much higher than they set for themselves. And over half the parents wanted their sons to attend a university; 43 percent wanted this for their daughters. Form 5 students echoed these aspirations: 59 percent wanted to attend a university, and 57 percent felt their parents wanted this as well. Parents put the pressure on their children. Seventy percent scolded their children about their homework sometimes or many times.

Some schools were providing opportunities for students to channel their energies into civic activities and leadership roles. Extra-curricular community service was encouraged through school-based Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Junior Red Cross, and St. John's Ambulance Brigade; other groups provided social support to enrich academic interests (e.g., debate, science, history and language clubs).

Government schools, especially the high-quality ones (as measured by pass rates on the School Leaving Examination in 1967), had the most active extra-curricular environments with higher rates of student membership (and leadership) in these activities. The clubs and activities had a Western ring to them, suggesting that the sponsoring schools (which were Anglo-Chinese) were helping to orient their students to life in a world different from what many saw as traditional Chinese ways. As the number of schools increased over the years, and as both academic quality and extra-curricular activities were strengthened, new generations of civil and political leaders emerged. These developments help explain the growth of Hong Kong's social capital.[24]

Rising levels of education and income were already strengthening social capital among the adult population. The more edu-

cated, for example, had stronger ties with their relatives. And education had the same effects on involvement in non-kinship networks. For example, among women age 29 or younger, 19 percent who never attended school, in contrast to 53 percent who finished secondary school or higher, reported they had three or more close friends. Furthermore, involvement in kinship and non-kinship networks were mutually supportive of one another rather than representing competing pulls. The UFLS (Mitchell 1972b, p. 463) concluded that "anything that helps strengthen the nuclear family and the husband-wife bond also thereby helps strengthen larger kinship and non-kinship social networks." That means "that the forces that are re-structuring the nuclear family will also bring new vigor into others areas of social life as well."

Few if any of the forces underlying the institutional transformation of Hong Kong were intended or anticipated.[25] In fact, existing information systems helped hide the changes from colonial officials. The English-language *South China Morning Post (SCMP)*, and its *Sunday Herald*, was their establishment newspaper. We did a content analysis of the editorials in this and five other newspapers covering "contrived" weeks in 1951, 1956, 1961 and 1966 (Mitchell 1969b). Two Chinese papers were from the left wing, two others were on the right, and both the *SCMP* and *The Standard* covered the English-language press. Although the *SCMP* editorials increased their attention to Hong Kong issues (up from 16 percent of all 1961 editorials to 35 percent in 1966), it was well behind *The Standard* (62 percent), one right-wing paper (99 percent), and the others as well. When the *SCMP* mentioned government, it was in a positive or neutral tone. Only 14 percent of its 1966 editorials on Hong Kong were critical of government, four times less than the left-wing papers and two times less than the right-wing ones. Moreover, all papers (except one on the right-wing) had little to say on what policies might be considered. Fewer than 15 percent of the two left-wing and *SCMP* editorials on the colony suggested new policies.

The colony's establishment newspaper did not compensate for the lack of a loyal opposition and expertise to comment con-

structively on government policies and management. The failure of the establishment press probably contributed to the apparent complacency of the civil service and to the foreign community's shock by the 1966-67 social unrest. Adding to this dilution of politics was the very concept of what was political and what was administration. Both the colonial government and the self-proclaimed social work-type representatives of the common people seemed to have defined policy issues as administrative rather than political ones.[26] Politics was social administration, and as a colony, politics was not to be so openly discussed.

These observations are relevant today to the extent that the media censors itself, thereby covering-up politically-relevant issues. And an executive-dominated government knows-best attitude that takes a social-administration approach to political issues can suppress issues that are best addressed in other ways.

The Next 30 Years

The UFLS was not intended to predict developments in 1997 based on findings from 1967. We can look back from 1997 to 1967 to suggest some of the forces that shaped today's Hong Kong. This, however, is not prediction.

The forces giving shape to the present are based on aggregated individual-level data and do not refer to programs and institutions that have evolved over time. As will be briefly noted below, Hong Kong's institutional environment and government's portfolio of programs have gone through fundamental changes and expansion, so that to many observers, 1997 bears little resemblance to the colony in 1967.[27] However, the Hong Kong we have described 30 years ago suggests some of the reasons why the population at that time was able to accommodate the constraints of tradition and the stresses of a very difficult working and living environment.

It would be folly to attempt to forecast the future. But there are lessons to be learned from the past. Eleven will be suggested.

First, the traditional Chinese family is probably a relative rarity in present-day Hong Kong. This is a positive development, for the new family is smaller, stronger, and more likely to assist its members in need. *This should reduce the "need" for basic social services, although it is likely that the "demand" for new services will increase,* as they certainly have. Second, this transformation away from the traditional family was accompanied by a decline in traditional values and rules that not only affect families but have more general community-wide implications. *This change gives little support to whose who argue that the current Chinese Way and Asian values are active forces in opposition to individual rights and greater democracy.* (India's vibrant democracy also contradicts those promoting the incompatibility between democracy and Asian values.)

Third, labor laws adopted over the years probably helped strengthen families. Government can and did have positive social effects. Fourth, because Hong Kong workers give such a high priority to making money, even a temporary downturn in the economy could encourage greater citizen action in the new environment of strengthened social capital at all levels of society. Fifth, Government need not take responsibility for meeting the demand for better housing. *Obtaining* these improvements does not require that government *provide* them. This holds for all social services, not housing alone. Sixth, given that congestion is more destructive of families than density is, continuing attention should be given to urban design improvements.

Seventh, self-censorship by the media can suppress information about and understanding of important trends that the public and private sectors need to recognize and accommodate. It appears that self-censorship has already begun. Eighth, new forms of government-by-worthies under an executive-centered government can have negative economic and political implications. From an economic perspective, Hong Kong's current post-colonial government appears likely to strengthen certain segments of this society by favoring occupationally-based interest groups (over geographically-defined districts) in forthcoming elections. *This syndicalism pushes single-issue interests at the expense of more diffuse*

civic ones. Business-based pressure groups, in combination with pressures from government interests in China, could lead to redistributive economic policies and a significant weakening of the open economy on which Hong Kong's success was based. From a political perspective, this syndicalism and executive-dominated system is likely to frustrate a highly educated middle-income, western (US)-oriented population's expectations regarding the role it is to have in deciding and implementing government policy.[28]

Ninth, symptoms of syndicalism also exist in the social sectors, including NGOs and among social welfare workers. Their language of social administration can depoliticisize issues that need to be publicly vetted. Tenth, social sector priorities need to be updated. Doing so will affect budgets and those who benefit from them. The 62 family service centers with 575 family caseworkers no doubt helped many of the 60,398 cases served in 1995, but in the Hong Kong context, these community-based, often activist civil servants also can represent an activist, narrow-interest pressure group. (There were 163 social centers for the elderly in 1995, 24 multi-service centers, 23 day-care centers, 107 home help teams, and many others in a single government welfare agency alone.[29]) As suggested earlier, education may warrant more attention, and the public sector need not occupy as prominent a role as it has recently. (Spending on education in 1995-96 took 22 percent of government's recurrent expenditures and 6 percent of the capital expenditures. As in other sectors, 1997 programs and institutions are far different from [and better than] what existed 30 years ago.)

Government itself is aware that in building its administrative capacity and adding to various programs, it also expanded the size of the civil service and public expenditures as a proportion of GDP. The civil service added about 80,000 workers from 1975-76 to 1992-93, when it was about 190,000, or 7 percent of the work force.[30] (Today's 1,100 resident American firms employ 250,000 Hong Kong workers, 10 percent of the work force.[31]) Public expenditures as a proportion of GDP rose from 14.2 percent to 18.8

percent during the same period. The colony's comprehensive social security income-support scheme is rapidly expanding as well. Expenditures rose by 31 percent in the single year from 1994 to 1995. Expenditures on old-age and disability allowances for 492,400 people increased by 10.8 percent during the same one-year period. Hong Kong under a conservative British government in London took significant steps on the way to a welfare state, even though the colonial government claimed "Hong Kong is not a welfare state but the community cares deeply about its state of welfare."[32] The above benefits and others represent a people-oriented legacy left by Britain's velvet colonialism; the benefits also create a fiscal burden that may be difficult for China to assume in the intermediate future.

The functions, staff and budget the colonial government added over the years meant greater complexity and escalating popular expectations for new and improved services. In addition to an increase in government departments and programs, 5,720 members of the public served on 563 boards and committees advising the government in 1994 (Miners 1995, p. 111). The danger of governance overload was ever present.

It is well beyond the purpose of this paper to summarize all the many reforms proposed and implemented since 1967.[33] In contrast to the very thin literature on the colony in the 1960s, we have today a good size library describing government operations in the recent past. Still, the growth in government's size and complexity leads to the eleventh and final lesson of experience, one that goes beyond the individual-level data we have reported above: governance in the Special Administrative Region can benefit from continuing the linkages the civil service has established with Western reformers over the years.

Major efforts to improve transparency, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness began as early as 1968 when Sir Charles Hartwell was asked to review the organization and procedures of the Colonial Secretary (Bray 1968). Mackenzie and Co. conducted organizational studies in the early 1970s, although it appears that few if any of their major recommendations were adopted. Later

on, government entered into an agreement with the University of California-Berkeley to train promising civil servants (Phillips et al. 1992). And the colony followed Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada in re-inventing government some years ahead of the United States government's initiatives along the same lines (Lee et al. 1995). Unlike these other countries, reforms in the colony were not driven by privatization, budget deficits, or demands from elected leaders and the general public. There has been a professionalization of reforms that emphasizes long-term strategic planning, performance, and setting priorities on the basis of value-added criteria.

Corruption and accountability were addressed early with the creation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption after a police corruption scandal in 1974. (The Commission received 3,232 reports of alleged corruption in 1995; 58 percent referred to the private sector.[34]) There are more newspapers, many looking for scandals. Public opinion polling, which was largely limited to market and academic research in the 1960s (Mitchell 1968b), is well accepted; the colonial government precedes its White Papers with Green ones that are drafts for public vetting. And in addition to relaxing the Societies Ordinance (controlling the regulation of community groups), open competitive elections were introduced prior to the colony's return to China on July 1, 1997.

Today's Hong Kong has an institutional structure different from and much more developed than that which existed in 1967 and in China today. This institutional landscape built on basic heavy trends already set in motion by 1967. The trends help explain Hong Kong's successful economic, institutional, and social transformation. They also suggest that the present government will need to recognize that Deng Xiaoping's one-country two-systems policy will create unusual social, political, and economic challenges not typical of China itself. In fact, it appears that there are two countries and two systems.

Notes

1. Post-1967 authors have used these and other terms to categorize time periods in Hong Kong's history. The emphasis has been on recent periods. See Catherine Jones (1990); Chan (1986); and Scott (1989).

2. These disturbances are covered by a number of authors. For the official account, see *Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan; Kowloon Disturbances 1966*. Also, see Cooper (1970). The UFLS main offices on the 10th floor of the On Lee Building at 545 Nathan Road in Mongkok, Kowloon, gave us close-up experiences with both sets of disturbances. Our pre-testing of the project's interview schedules took place in the New Territories early during the 1967 troubles.

3. These figures might be considered order-of-magnitude estimates. Income figures differ according to how they handle non-tradables, the exchange rate, and other items. And, of course, averages and medians do not capture the distribution of income. These issues are covered in Mitchell (1972a). For further discussion of income estimates and the factors affecting how they are derived, see note 12.

4. See *Kowloon Disturbances 1966*, p. 4.

5. The UFLS delivered three major reports to its Supervisory Board. Subsequently, a University of California-Berkeley colleague requested permission to have these reports published in book form, as represented in Mitchell (1972a, 1972b, 1972c). A number of other publications were based on the results of this research, as listed under Mitchell in the bibliography. This entire research program benefited from a young, remarkably-talented senior staff consisting, in alphabetical order, of Hermia Chen, Irene Lo, Annie Tsang, Barbara Meynert Wong, and Sophie Wong. Taking advantage of IBM's new office in Hong Kong, we were able, under Donald Chow, to start The Chinese University of Hong Kong's first computer facility.

6. Considerable prior work was done on how to reduce sampling, measurement and interviewer errors. See Mitchell

(1965a, 1965b, 1968f). The logic of social research was fairly new to the social welfare community in the 1960s. We tried in our reports to emphasize that answers to specific questions were "indicators" of underlying dimensions or variables, and that the indicators had certain probabilistic relationships with the dimensions. We typically marshaled an array of indicators. Some were combined in standard ways to construct an index — for example, of levels of strain or levels of stress. The large sample sizes meant that even relatively small differences in percentages or scores among sub-groups or categories were statistically significant. This was one reason we emphasized patterns of relationships among independent and dependent variables. These patterns were another way to establish statistical significance. Because, the UFLS reports were written for an educated lay audience, these technical and methodological issues were slighted on purpose.

7. Chau (1994, p. 505). An estimated half-million migrants entered the colony from 1977 through 1981. See Chan and Postiglione (1996, p. 135); p. 151 provides detailed information on the legal immigrants from 1983 through 1992.

8. Maurice Freedman (1958, 1966) was the leading expert on Chinese lineages. The UFLS was based on a thorough review of the literature on traditional Chinese families, social science studies in Southeast Asia, and family research elsewhere.

9. From information provided by speakers participating in *The Smithsonian Campus on the Mall's* Spring 1997 series on the return of Hong Kong to China. Also see the Hong Kong Government Information Centre and the internet archives of the *New York Times*.

10. Scott (1989, p. 70) reports a higher figure for 1950.

11. The 1931 figures are from the census of that year, as reported by Scott (1989, p. 66). It is possible that different definitions and enumeration procedures were used in 1931 and in 1996, as reported by the Census and Statistics Department's *1996 Population By-Census*.

12. There is little consensus on these income figures. The 1965 estimate comes from various UN and other statistics, as reported by Palmer (1970). Scott (1989, p. 71) refers to A. J. Youngson for a 1965 estimated GDP per capita of HK$4,776. Census Circular No. 5/71 (October 1971) estimated the 1966 mean household income to be US$709. The 1995 estimate we quote comes from *The Encyclopedia Britannica*. *The U.S. News & World Report* of June 9, 1997 (p. 47) reports a 1996 per capita income of US$27,202. See Chau (1994) for a discussion of some of the technical issues involved in making these estimates as well as those for income inequality and unemployment. Mitchell (1972a, Chapter 9) examines the components of income, income inequality, and differences between working men and working women. By one set of estimates, working men had a mean annual income of $1,152 while working women earned $612.

13. Figures come from the Hong Kong Government Information Centre.

14. See Mitchell (1972d) for the figures reported in this section as well as an analysis of housing in developing countries.

15. Figures come from the Hong Kong Government Information Centre.

16. See Calhoun (1983). The author's contribution to this volume is Section 9-3.

17. Mitchell (1971a). Agnes Ng (1981, p. 77) refers to this research as "a study noted for the caution of its conclusions." I would substitute another term for *caution* when different technologies (e.g., partial regressions) and methodologies were used to draw inferences based on the available evidence.

18. For an interesting analysis of Hong Kong land, building, and development controls, see Booth (1996).

19. Hayes wrote that "[m]y impression of Hong Kong in the mid 1950s is that it was still a very 'colonial' society in which a small expatriate elite held itself apart from, and considered itself superior to, the mass of the native population. There was a good deal of snobbery among the British community

that was self-energizing and self-perpetuating." On the other hand, "[s]uch exchanges at the top of local society did not greatly influence or direct the social behavior of those in its middle ranks, the civil servants and business executives who comprise the bulk of the British and foreign residents at any one time" (1990, p. 7). He goes on to say that "the attitude of British colonial society in Hong Kong was part of a much longer and older tradition of superiority, and of a new rationalised claim to privilege and position" (1990, p. 12).

20. For other voting statistics, see Miners (1995, Chapter 3).

21. See *Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan.*

22. Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995). For recent critiques and qualifications of his work, see the 1995 through 1997 issues of *The American Prospect.*

23. *Kowloon Disturbances 1966*; and Cooper (1970).

24. A 1977 survey found "that less than 20 percent of respondents had joined any voluntary association, and of these only three (0.5 percent of the respondents) were members of a political organization." Miners (1995, p. 33).

25. One unintended force thought by many to be negative was the perceived isolation of schools from their surrounding community. Hong Kong failed to develop neighborhood schools and the focus these could provide for community-based civic action. See the chapters in Chan and Postiglione (1996).

26. "[N]o less than 20 of the 22 community social workers who stood for" the 1985 District Board elections were successful. Catherine Jones (1990, pp. 70-71). She also refers to Hong Kong's "'activist' social policy community" (1990, p. 223).

27. However, a number of government commissions and their reports issued from 1966 through 1969 helped pave the way for the subsequent cascade of reforms that began in the early 1970s. Among the various reports, in addition to those included in the bibliography, were *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope and Operation of the Urban Council* (August 1966), *Report of the Working Party on Local Administra-*

tion (November 1966, released 1967), *Report by the Interdepartmental Working Group to Consider Certain Aspects of Social Security* (April 1967), *The City District Officer Scheme, A Report by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs* (January 1969). In addition, a number of major physical infrastructure projects were planned and began implementation during this period.

28. For a description of Hong Kong "pressure groups," see Miners (1995, Chapter 13). For the classic statements on the adverse effects that certain kinds of special-interest groups can have on democracies and economic development, see Olson (1965, 1982).

29. The 1995 figures come from the Hong Kong Government Information Centre.

30. Ibid.

31. For more information on American firms in Hong Kong, see United States Department of State (1997).

32. Hong Kong Government Information Centre.

33. These are covered in Catherine Jones (1990); John Jones (1981); Kwan and Chan (1986); Lee and Cheung (1995); Leung and Wong (1994); Miners (1995); Scott (1989). We again emphasize that the present paper is not a history of the Hong Kong community and its governments. Instead, the emphasis is on the relevance that certain basic conditions and heavy trends have had on how the community developed over time and the challenges facing government leaders.

34. Figures come from the Hong Kong Government Information Centre.

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Velvet Colonialism's Legacy to Hong Kong
1967 and 1997

Abstract

What can the leaders of the Special Administrative Region and of China itself learn from a better understanding of Hong Kong's history?

History is more than the story of government actions and individual leaders. It also includes broad social, cultural and economic conditions, as well as heavy, long-term trends in them. Trends provide a time-dimension suggesting possible future directions. But time perspectives are not sufficient, for it also helps to have benchmarks that compare Hong Kong Chinese with other Chinese and non-Chinese in the region. This comparative perspective helps avoid narrow cultural parochialism and associated myths about traditional Chinese ways and Asian values. Large-scale sample surveys conducted in Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan in 1967 provide both time and comparative benchmarks.

The Hong Kong Urban Family Life Survey was initiated in response to the perceived decline of the traditional Chinese family and the implications this decline had for social policy. Colonial leaders and others in 1966-67 shared with Hong Kong's current government leaders some of the same views about these families and Chinese culture more generally. Their shared myths can lead to inappropriately sized programs and budget priorities.

This paper suggests some of the ways that present-day Hong Kong is a product of earlier family and population trends, the way certain physical environments affected people, the basis for organized social life, and what might be considered more ephemeral attitudes toward civic and political issues. Representative findings were that non-traditional families were stronger than traditional

ones; congestion, not density, adversely affected families and individuals; Chinese throughout the region did well in managing their poverty; making money was a central value in one's work, even though income levels were low and few felt they had much opportunity for career success; and Hong Kong's future elite at the time held Western orientations while feeling intellectually equal to or superior to Westerners, and many thought that Western influence had been bad for the colony. These and other findings are the basis for a series of eleven implications drawn from this research as relevant to Hong Kong today.

While there are some similarities among Chinese throughout the region, Hong Kong is different in ways that suggest that, instead of one country, two systems, there are two countries and two systems.

天鵝絨色殖民主義留給香港的遺產

一九六七年與一九九七年

Robert E. Mitchell

（中文摘要）

更好地了解香港的歷史會對特別行政區及中國本身的領袖有何啓示？

歷史不只是政府及個別領袖事功的記錄，歷史還包括廣泛的社會、文化和經濟環境，以及其中沉重和長期的趨勢。這些趨勢提供一種時間的視野，顯示未來的可能動向。這樣的時間視野仍未足夠，還需要借助一些指標，以便將香港華人和此地區內的其他華人與非華人進行比較，這樣子的比較有助於避免陷入狹隘的地方主義，以及與之相關連的中國傳統處事方式、亞洲價值觀等神話。一九六七年在香港、泰國、馬來西亞、星加坡和台灣等地進行的大規模抽樣調查，提供了這種時間視野和比較角度的指標。

「香港城市家庭生活調查」的進行，是因應傳統中國家庭已被預見的沒落，以及此沒落對社會政策的影響。一九六六至六七年時的殖民領袖和其他人士，與現今香港的政府領袖，在家庭及更爲一般性的中國文化問題上，有若干相同的觀點，他們所共同相信的神話會導致規模不恰當的施政計劃和財政調撥。

本文嘗試指出今日之香港在若干方面爲較早時家庭及人口發展趨勢之結果，某些自然環境影響居民之過程，社會生

活得以開展之基礎，以及人們對待民眾及政治事務種種堪稱短視的態度。有代表性的研究發現包括：非傳統家庭比傳統家庭來得強固；擠擁（而非密度）對家庭及個人造成惡劣影響；在此地域內的所有華人對於應付貧窮都很有辦法；賺錢是每個人在工作上的主要價值，雖然收入水平甚低以及只有少數人覺得有機會取得事業成就；香港的未來精英分子在自覺智力相等或優於西方人的同時，卻抱有西方式的取向，其中不少人亦認為西方影響對殖民地有壞效果。基於上述的發現及其他成果，本研究提出十一項對今日香港情況有參考價值的分析。

雖然本地區的所有華人有若干相同之處，但香港所具有的獨特性似乎顯示真正情況其實是兩個國家、兩種制度，而非一個國家、兩種制度。